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SUBCARPATHIAN RUTHENIA IN CONDITIONS
OF PRE-WAR INTERNATIONAL CRISIS OF 1938 AND
TERRITORIAL ENCROACHMENTS OF NEIGHBORING STATES
(ON REGIONAL PRESS MATERIALS)
Through the prism of the Subcarpathian press of the first third of the twentieth century, the
tragic period of establishment of the Ukrainian statehood on the eve of World War II, the struggle
for the free development of the Ukrainian nation on the territory of Subcarpathian Ruthenia due to
the Munich Agreement and the dangerous political game of England, France, Germany and Italy,
as well as Poland and Hungary, in the epicenter of ambitions of which Transcarpathia was caught,
is delineated. Further development was given to the issues of struggle of the Ukrainians in
Transcarpathia for the realization of the "peoples' right to self-determination" in the course of the
forceful formation of the joint Polish-Hungarian border after the Second Czechoslovak crisis of
1938, which had given rise to the actual division of Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and the
intensification of Ukrainians' national aspirations - on the other. The geopolitical aspects of the
game of the Central Powers, as well as of Poland and Hungary in the process of "redrawing
Europe", the international peculiarities of the policy of appeasement of an aggressor of 1938 as a
process of concessions and losses, in which the Transcarpathian lands remained as currency and
the government of the autonomous Subcarpathian Ruthenia had to struggle alone against imperial
revisionism, aggressive propaganda and destructive armed sabotage, were analyzed. Based on
the Transcarpathian periodicals, the development of relations between the Carpathian Ukraine
and practically the only foreign-policy partner - Germany - is shown in the context of the formation
of the Hitler's strategy of the "Eurasian Axis", where the Ukrainian lands had a significant role.
Factors of influence on the formation of the new European political reality and the role of the
Ukrainian country in it are investigated. When using the press as a key source of historical data, a
comprehensive picture of the Central Powers' encroachments and aspirations and their practical
intentions in an international crisis is reflected.
Keywords: Subcarpathian Rus; Carpathian Ukraine; Rusyns-Ukrainians; Czechoslovak crisis of 1938;
Munich Agreement; press; "Ukrainian Piedmont"; common border.
Introduction
The Munich Agreement of England, France, Germany
and Italy created an extremely favorable situation for
Germany in Central Europe, which allowed Hitler to have a
decisive impact on the fate of the Central European part of
the region. Western states that pursued a policy of appea-
sement of the aggressor, in fact, recognized the priority
positions of the Third Reich there and preferred to play the
role of an outside observer. As a result of the Munich col-
lusion, Czechoslovakia was significantly weakened be-
cause of loss of the territories, important in the military-
strategic and economic terms and about a third of its popu-
lation, which went mainly to Germany (the Sudetenland).
The result of the Second Czechoslovak crisis of 1938 was
the division of Czechoslovakia into three parts, each trying
to pursue domestic and foreign policies at its discretion
without regard to the presence of the single center.
Drawing on a variety of sources, authors set the pur-
pose to reproduce and substantiate the reflection in the
periodicals of the attitude of Ukrainians to the policies of
the Central Powers and, accordingly, of the European
countries to the issue of Subcarpathian Ruthenia in the
post-Munich period of 1938. On the basis of formulating
their own general conclusions about the importance of
the press as a unique source of resources, the authors of
scientific exploration have the opportunity to disclose little-
known pages of political processes in Transcarpathia du-
ring the pre-war period.
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Methods
The methodological basis of scientific exploration is
the principle of historical method and scientific objectivity.
System-analytical approach allows to consider the sour-
ces, nature and specificity of international processes and
phenomena of the pre-war period. The interconnections
of internal and external factors of development of social
and public relations were revealed on the basis of historical
and political researches in the world and in Ukraine, which
involves the principle of multifactorial analysis. The ques-
tion of the ideological and social importance of the authority
of the policy of concessions and compromises in the con-
text of the formation of concepts of political culture provides
the approach of systems of both the integral perception of
the object of study and the comprehensive analysis of the
relations between its individual elements.
The sources of this scientific research are archival
documents held in the State Archives of Zakarpatska Oblast
(Transcarpathian region), the Military Historical Archive of
the Institute of Military History in Prague, the Hungarian
State Archives, the holdings of the Royal Hungarian Uni-
versity Press. Published archival materials are presented
by Soviet collections of documents, foreign Ukrainian stu-
dies, epistolary and memorial heritage of Yu. Brashchaiko
(2009), A. Voloshyn (1995), V. Grenzha-Donskіі (1987;
2003) and monographs by researchers of historical scien-
ce M. Vegesh (2018), V. Hyria (2012), I. Homeniuk (2018),
V. Kosyk (1993), L. Trofymovych (2018). Documentary con-
firmation of the tendencies and peculiarities of the course
of crisis events of 1938 are newspaper and journal pub-
lications of different ideological directions ("Ukrainske
Slovo", "Svoboda", "Nova Svoboda", "Karpatorusky Go-
los"). Authors emphasize that the interwar press was an
important factor of influence on the political culture and
national consciousness of Ukrainians in Subcarpathian
Ruthenia. Taking into account the democratic endeavors
of the Czechoslovak Republic, which included Subcar-
pathia, the province's press, in addition to informing the
population about international events of the time, served
as the national voice of freedom, liberation and state
formation.
Results
Following the Munich conference, the Czechoslovak
crisis faced internal political conflicts and complex inter-
national claims. Due to the socio-political circumstances
of 1938, Transcarpatia, which was located in the center of
Europe, was inalterably in the field of interests of the
various European states. The territory of the region became
the scene of a "hybrid war" by the side of neighboring
Hungary and Poland. Due to European agreements, not
only the Sudeten-German but also the Polish and Hun-
garian issues were agreed. In spite of whatever efforts the
British would make to delineate those issues, they had
however to put pressure on the Czechs and call them to
address complex of contradictory national issues. In "Uk-
rainske Slovo" Hitler's demand made to Czechoslovakia
on solving its problems with its neighbors was compared
with the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary to Serbia in 19141.
An article about the principle of people's self-determination
was published in the "Slovo" on October 15 with reference
to the "Vö lkischer Beobachter" and the "Nazional Zeitung".
The main idea of the message of lessons of the past, in
particular the national causes of the collapse of the Habs-
burg empire were mentioned in a memorial heritage:
"The closer ethnographic borders and ethnographic
boundaries are and the less mixed nationalities are, what
resulted from the Versailles disorder, the sooner peace
and calm will come. We the Rusyns-Ukrainians of Sub-
carpathian Ruthenia will not be tolerated cutting parts from
our living body and giving presentations of it to other
states!" (Brashchaiko, 2009: 38).
Polish-Hungarian territorial claims on a part of Czecho-
slovakia, the creation of a common border between the
states, which would separate the latter from Romania, its
ally in the Little Entente, were of direct relevance to the
Subcarpathian public interest. It was the matter of their
territorial security and state sovereignty, therefore the
opposition to those particular claims was the main task of
the Ukrainian regional authorities which relegated projects
of the federal arrangement of Subcarpathian lands to the
background in October-November 1938. In September,
"Nova Svoboda"2 publishes its items from the position of
its self-interest and hypothetical plans of the neighbors,
"...the intentions of the Poles and Hungarians are unjust
because history shows that their fate depends on the si-
tuation and sometimes international community generously
rewarded or crushed them to complete destruction of their
statehood".
In October 1938, "Ukrainske slovo" compared the arbit-
rariness of neighbors with the actions of Hitler's Germany
"the surprise at Germany loses its uniqueness when we
understand the adequacy of Poland's demands on its
neighbor state". At the same time, the despair of the Ukrai-
nian society echoed due to the unwillingness of the great
states to solve the Ukrainian issue. Repeatedly, in the
press of the Subcarpathia, the Poles of Cieszyn and Ost-
rava lands were mentioned, to which Munich had given
the right to self-determination, and to the Ukrainians of
Eastern Galicia it had not:
"If they want to establish an ethnographic principle, then
the Poles take 80,000 from the Czechs, so will 8 million
Ukrainians be given autonomy? It is best to use the prin-
ciple "If you give, you give back". The unity of the nation,
the integration of the people can be achieved using the
principle of ethnic identity. Here we can take the German
example" 3.
The Subcarpathian press informed about the actions
of Poland, which, based on German experience and taking
the opportunity (in the official versions - "defending the
right of peoples to self-determination"), obtained conces-
sions from Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian press spared
no epithets for the Poles: "executioners", "chauvinists",
"oppressors", "invaders". Demonstration of Poland's deter-
mination was accompanied by power methods when,
according to a German scenario, there were some hand
grenades and revolvers, forwarded by Polish fighters,
found in the Village of Jablunkov near Cieszyn. Having
come over to another stage of the relationship with their
neighbor, the Poles demanded the annexation of the
Cieszyn land in the form of an ultimatum. In early October
1938, elated by the first success, Poland demanded a
plebiscite in the districts of Slezská Ostrava and Frýdek,
which were mainly inhabited by the Czechs, and laid claims
to the Bohumin railway junction. Despite the dramatic
historical moment, the Poles proceeded to the implemen-
tation of a project of a common border with Hungary (Ho-
meniuk, 2017: 56). "Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny" named
1 Українське слово (Ukrainske Slovo). Sept.23.1938, page 1.
2 Нова свобода (Nova Svoboda). Sept., 24 1938, page 1.
3 Українське слово (Ukrainske Slovo). Oct.08.1938, page 2.
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that demand "an issue of economic importance rather than
a rhetorical question".
Bringing forward the ultimatum and further accession
of the Czech part of Cieszyn Silesia to Poland was regarded
by world community as a proof of coordination of the po-
licies of Poland and Germany. A wave of indignation
against the actions of Poland swept through both Czecho-
slovakia and France. Two weeks later, on October 11,
N. Chamberlain in London even had to allege his igno-
rance of Poland's intentions about an occupation and
division of the Czech lands, especially the Subcarpathian
Ruthenia, between Poland and Hungary. The French poin-
ted out "... that the steps of Poland were tactless and ignoble
and took advantage of the neighbor's difficulties in such a
brute way" (Polski dyversiĭ ni dii…, 1998: 28). W. Churchill
was rather sharp in his memoirs, noting:
"Nowadays, in 1938, due to such a minor issue as
Cieszyn, the Poles have broken up with all their friends in
France, England and the USA, who brought them back to a
unified national life and whose help they might soon need
so much. We have seen how they have hastened to seize
their share during the plunder and ruin of Czechoslovakia
now that the reflection of the power of Germany has flashed
on them" (Ibid: 29).
"Ukrainske Slovo" of September 23 від 23 reference to
тhe Czech "Venkov" stated:
"Out of 34 million people in Poland, 12 million are
national minorities, and there is 80 millioned Germany close
by, which has recently been quite zealously defending the
right of peoples to self-determination. At the time when
agreements are a mere scrap of paper, the situation for
Poland is even worse than for us".
To confirm the unresolved territorial issues between
the Germans and the Poles, "Ukrainske Slovo" of October
6 revealingly described the demarche of the Polish Ambas-
sador, when the issue of returning Danzig and Pomerania
was raised at a reception at the French Parliament4.
According to publishers of Uzhgorod, Hungary conti-
nued a significant violation of the geopolitical balance in
Europe by its expansionist actions. The change in the bor-
ders of the Czech Socialist Republic resulted in stepping-
up of the territorial claims and ethnically based revision on
the part of Hungary too, which had been seeking to revise
the Treaty of Trianon of 1920 throughout the interwar period.
Yet on September 22, 1938, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry
sent a note to the Czechoslovak government, which
demanded the transfer of the Czechoslovak territories,
inhabited by the Hungarians, and granting them the right
to self-determination.
4 Українське слово (Ukrainske Slovo). Oct.06.1938, page 1.
5 URL: https://hungaricana.hu/hu/search/results/?list=eyJxdWVye-
SI6ICJSdXRlbmlhPyogMTkzOCoifQ
Fig. 1. The map "Twenty years of Hungarians in Upper Hungary 1918-1938"
(A felvidéki magyarság húsz éve 1918-1938 (Budapest. Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1938)5.
It should be pointed out that the principle of the right to
self-determination was extrapolated by the Hungarians in
the territorial and historical rather than ethnic context, and
as early as in the spring of 1938 in Transcarpathia there
was information about a plebiscite on accession to Hun-
gary. A report by the Berezan Gendarmerie Department
informed about a planned Hungarian irredenta6 and this
was widely spread by the local population.
On October 19, "Ukrainske Slovo" reported an interes-
ting fact about the methods of territorial claims of Hungary,
which Slovakia' Prime Minister J. Tiso noted. The argument
of the Hungarians for land acquisition was the population
census of 1910, during which commissioners recorded a
large number of people "under the heading of the Magyar
nationality all who could speak Hungarian". J. Tiso, Slova-
kia's first official, recalled that he was also "Hungarian"
according to this census.
Hungary's claims to the Uzhhorod, Mukachevo and
Berehovo cities with a minority of the Magyar population,
according to Yu. Brashchaiko, contradicted common
sense and moral principles. Even in the census of 1910,
Jews were on the first place in the population of these
cities and the Slavs - on the second. This city had always
been considered by Ukrainians-Rusyns to be their origi-
nal cultural center since 1775, when Empress Maria The-
resa passed the castle and Katulska Street to the Greek-
Catholic bishopric and its bishop A. Bachynskyi (Bra-
shchaiko, 2009: 39).
In its claims Hungary outstepped the senior German
friend and, as indicated in the secret encrypted telegram
of the Foreign Minister of Hungary K. Kánya to the Am-
bassador in Prague J. Vetstein on October 3, 1938, it
demanded "to transfer 2-3 Czechoslovak border towns
with deployment of troops there as a symbolic concession
6 Державний архів Закарпатської області (далі - ДАЗО Украї-
ни). Fond 2, List 1, File. 325, Page 53 [State archive of Transcar-
pathian region]
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well before the approval of the final decision" (Vengriya i
Vtoraya Mirovaya voina, 1962: 111).
Allowing for the support of Germany and Italy, which
Hungary became closer with in the second half of the
1930s, the claims indicate the accession of the territories
of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. With tacit position
of France and Great Britain as well as political games of
the fascist states, the government of autonomous Subcar-
pathian Ruthenia began to fight for its country virtually
single-handedly against "Magyar revisionism, imperialism,
propaganda, the former conqueror", seeking assistance
of the German state.
Fig. 2. Title pages of the publications "Narodna Politika" and "Nova Svoboda"
with the headlines regarding new borders of Subcarpathian Ruthenia.
On October 16, 1938, at the Great Demonstration
Meeting of the Ukrainian People's Council, A. Voloshyn as
a representative of the government of its Ukrainophilia
current called on all Ukrainian community to declare their
unwillingness to join Hungary, "where we were slaves,
manure of Magyars" (Ternystyi shliakh do Ukrainy, 2007:
145), through telegraphic appeals to the great states. It
was interesting that, showing the statist consciousness,
the regional representative body (the First Ukrainian
Central People's Council) in a situation of extreme conflict
with its southern neighbor, in the Manifesto of October 21,
demanded from Prague "to ensure the present borders
against Magyaria and to consolidate the whole Zemplyn-
shchyna and Š ariš ký and Spiš ské regions with our popu-
lation to Subcarpathia" (Grenzha-Donskіі, 2003: 315-317).
In most European countries, the problem of aggression
of neighbors that was felt so strongly by Ukrainians de-
pended on the opinion of leading political players. In
publications of October 11-21 the following positions are
indicated: Italy stood demonstratively neuter, abandoning
itself to the idea that Hungary had to be transferred only
ethnic lands without the Hungarian-Polish border in view
of reconciliation with the neighbors, because the Versailles
system would collapse and no one would guarantee the
borders of Czechoslovakia; Yugoslavia and Romania
opposed significant attacks by Hungary as the latter
understood that it would lose control of the communication
to Prague. The Romanian interest is confirmed by a tele-
phone message of the Hungarian Ambassador in Poland,
where it is pointed out:
"...the railroad issue is of so great concern to the
Romanians that we need to pin everybody down to the fact
as quickly as possible by blasting the railway in Chop, for
which Polish and sabotage groups are ready" (Ternystyi
shliakh do Ukrainy.., 2007: 63).
In an effort to establish a common border in the Car-
pathian Mountains, Poland and Hungary tried to destabilize
the situation in the region in every possible way by sending
a group of combatants from 600 to 2 thousand people
across the border to implement acts of sabotage and terror
against the units of the Ukrainian National Defense (UNO)
on the Czechoslovak borderzone (Hyria, 2012: 107). Their
actions coincided with the collapse of the Hungarian-
Czechoslovak talks on October 9-13, 1938 in Komarno. In
particular, the Hungarian general staff, through public
associations "Levente" and "MOV", organized sabotage-
terrorist groups "Sobot Chopotok - Free Squads" and
"Rongyos gárd - Guard of ragamuffins" (300-500 each)
led by M. Kozmi and I. Geyash (Teroarea …, 1985: 49-52),
united with the local "Russkiy Scout", who since the be-
ginning of October 1938 had regularly pestered the south
of the region, carrying out repeated attacks on Czech border
guards and evacuation convoys, in particular in Borżawa
village, Mukachevo, Beregovo, Uzhhorod (Radwań ce)
cities, destroying rail, telephone and telegraph communi-
cations and trying to give the impression of the existence
of a powerfully armed pro-Hungurian movement here
(Grenzha-Donskіі, 1987: 23).
As a result of terrorist operations, combatants were
killed or injured. Sabotage detachments of "black shirts",
according to some reports, operated under the patronage
of Greek Catholic priest S. Fencik, guided by the slogan
"drichni Ruthenians all are up in arms because they want
to join Hungary" 7, and they were aimed to exacerbate the
situation in the region. S. Fencik's role in the provokation
of the subcarpathian community is confirmed by the Oc-
tober reports of the Hungarian television office. Each re-
ported focus was on the "Rusyn Brothers" in Subcarpathian
Ruthenia, which was made a colony by the Czechs, on a
favorable economic base that formed over 8 centuries of
Ruthenia as part of the Hungarian kingdom. However,
nationalist forces indicated that the Hungarians, using the
German example, wanted to change the service to God,
the calendar, take the land from the peasants, make them
labor power, employ for 30,000 unemployed intellectuals
awaiting accession to the "mother state"8.
7 Нова свобода (Nova Svoboda). Oct.,18, 1938, page 1.
8 Ibid: page 2.
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Fig. 3. The message of the office of Hungarian
television from 01.11.1938.
(Archivum Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár (MN OL)9
The idea of a joint Polish-Hungarian border faced, for
a reason, the resistance from Romania which bordered
the Subcarpathian Ruthenia in the south-east. In addition
to severed relations with Czechoslovakia, the Romanians
feared that Hungary's territorial appetites might spread to
their country as well. Even J. Beck during his autumn visit
to Bucharest failed to change a negative attitude of local
leaders to the "great Magyar idea". The latter would prefer
that region to be occupied by Poland.
Poland no less than Hungary wanted to establish a
common border which would solve the Ukrainian national
issue for the Poles (according to some insiders, on October
19 the Foreign Minister of Poland J. Beck in Bucharest
offered to transfer to Romania a part of Ruthenia with 40
thousand Romanians). In a conversation with Hitler, he
confirmed the Polish side's desire not to raise the Ukrai-
nian issue for peace in the region. In a conversation with
Hitler, he confirmed the Polish side's desire not to raise
the Ukrainian issue for peace in the region. According to
him, the Carpathian Ukraine was inhabited by Rusyns who
had nothing common with the Ukrainians (Kosyk, 1993:
64). And in light of the messages from "Karpatorusskiy
Golos"10 of the former Foreign Minister V. Paneik, regarding
a likely autonomous association of the Subcarpathians
and the Galicians with the support of Germany, it is not
strange that the Poles, given those circumstances, be-
came the greatest lobbyists of Hungarian interests. If we
consider the demands for the common border as a
precedent, nearly all countries rejected them. Otherwise
they faced endless national conflicts within the countries
themselves.
It is likely that was precisely why during the Vienna
arbitration on November 2, 1939 the Foreign Minister of
Germany J. Ribbentrop disagreed with the claims of Poland
and Hungary, backed by Italy, to the transfer of Subcar-
pathian Ruthenia and Slovakia to Hungary. The Foreign
Minister of Italy G. Ciano persuaded J. Ribbentrop to award
Hungary to the disputed towns and the Vienna arbitration
gave it the south of Slovakia and a 12 thousand km2 strip
of Subcarpathian Ruthenia with Uzhgorod, Mukachevo and
Beregovo. 172 thousand people lived there: 82 thousand
Hungarians, 33 thousand Ukrainians, 16.5 thousand
Slovaks and Czechs. The above caused a strong protest
of both the Ukrainian government of A. Voloshyn (1995:
129) and the American Defense Committee of the Subcar-
pathian region defense.
The French Ambassador to Berlin, Robert Coulondre
(Coulondre R., 1939: 40-41), was of the same opinion.
According to him, the Third Reich intended to ensure its
decisive role in Central Europe, conquer Czecho-Slovakia
and then establish "Great Ukraine" under German control:
"Hitler's entourage thinks about such an operation which
would repeat on a larger scale the operation in the Sudeten-
land: propaganding in Poland, Romania and the USSR for
granting independence to Ukraine; diplomatic support and
campaign by local volunteer groups at a propitious moment.
And Carpathian Ukraine would become a center of the
movement" 11.
Germany officially took the side of the eastern neigh-
bors in the conflict between Czechoslovakia and Hungary
because it had settled the issues with latter, which was
reported by "Nova Svoboda" of October 18 with reference
to "Berliner Tageblatt". Decentralization, stimulated by
Hitler's Germany, which played the role of a leading arbi-
trator of important political issues in central Europe, led to
the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Germany, "... limiting
its claims to an indigenous Sudeten-German region, pro-
ved that it considered only such solution of the issue as
long-term and stable". The press was already beginning
to talk about a full alliance between the Germans and the
Czechs, and some publications even suggested that offi-
cial Germany was interested in creating a Slovak-Ukrainian
federal state.
Realizing its interests step by step, Germany did not
seek to implement a project of a joint Hungarian-Polish
border despite ambivalent actions of Hitler and also the
next international conference, which could disrupt his plans.
A plebiscite was also not covered by the plans of the Nazi
leader since the process would include in electoral lists
the Jews of Czechoslovakia, living in the disputed terri-
tories. According to "Nova Svoboda"12, the population cen-
sus of 1910 indicated that they accounted for almost half
of the total number of voters, which was contrary to political
plans of the NSDAP. On November 27, "Nova Svoboda"
reported from Khust that Germany had put forward a note
of protest to Poland in respect of the common border with
Hungary. The above led to a crisis and the Polish govern-
ment resigned.
Radio stations in Vienna, Leipzig and Breslau reported
"...that the Ukrainians had nothing to worry about, not a
9 URL: https://library.hungaricana.hu/en/view/NapiHirek_1938-
_11_1/?query=Rutenia%3F*%201938*&pg=15&layout=s
10 Карпаторусский Голос. (Karpatorusskii golos). Oct., 13, 1938,
page 1.
11 Нова свобода (Nova Svoboda). Oct., 29, 1938, page 2.
12 Ibid. Oct., 18, 1938, page 1.
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single piece of land would fall under Hungarian rule".
Seemingly, the Ukrainian issue had to be positively settled
because the Czech magazine "Venkov" of October 29
published an article on the importance of creating Carpa-
thian Ukraine as a primary step of international politics
and Czechoslovakia survived as a state only thanks to the
Ukrainians and their political position. In the same period,
there appeared some anti-Czech leaflets, spread by Hun-
garian and Polish sabotage groups, which had the following
messages:
"the state built on lies has been partitioned", "do not
believe, you will be SLAVES again in new Czechoslovakia",
"the borders of Magyaria are coming nearer to you and you
are meeting them halfway" (Ternystyi shliakh do Ukrainy..,
2007: 31).
The irredenta of the pro-Hungarian forces was aggra-
vating the situation in the region every day. Not only calls
during meetings and demonstrations, but also other pro-
paganda methods and technologies were used to enhance
the effect of the "mother country concern". The pro-
Ukrainian Minister of the Regional Government, F. Revai,
collected anti-Ukrainian and anti-Czech flyers (leaflets) of
October-November in the peak of preparations to the
plebiscite, often with threats to government officials (Gren-
zha-Donskіі, 2003: 311-315).
"Brothers! The time for liberation has come! RUSYNS
everywhere deprived of a bit to eat! All the fruits of Your
fields were taken by Prague! Enough! Throw off the Czech
yoke! In a blaze of the crown of St. Stephen you will live in
wealth and enjoy religious, economic and political freedom"
(Polski dyversiĭ ni dii …, 1998: 63).
After fruitless negotiations in Komarno on Novem-
ber 2, 1938, with the consent of France and Great Britain,
Vienna hosted international arbitration of Germany and
Italy, which took a decision to adjust the state border
between Czechoslovakia and Hungary with an allowance
for the ethnic composition of the population of the neigh-
boring territories. The government of Carpathian Ukraine
was represented by Y. Brashchaiko and M. Dolinay in that
commission, who were not allowed to participate in the
conference. On November 5, Ukrainian periodicals came
out with the main message: "with a sore heart we advise
you as follows: the representatives were forced to accept
the conditions because we have no strength to fight with
world powers"13.
However, Hungary was not satisfied with the connection
of the southern territories to its territory by the international
arbitrament. On November 20, 1938, the full occupation of
the Carpathian Ukraine was planned. From the reports of
the Hungarian ambassador in Warsaw to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs Kálmán de Kánya it is known that the general
staffs of Hungary and Poland developed a formula of the
statement that "the Rusyn population asked Hungarian
and Polish troops to enter into the Rusyn region at the
same time". This commentary was prepared to explain
own annexationist actions to the world community (Vengriia
i Vtoraia Mirovaia voina, 1962: 132-135). Only the sharp
notes of Germany and Italy on November 21, 1938 forced
the Hungarians to cancel the dangerous plan.
The regional authorities of Subcarpathian Ruthenia,
which was granted autonomy under complete pressure,
chose a policy of search and support of an ally. In addition
to official Prague, the Ukrainians were supported by official
German circles. The positive "cordial" attitude of Ukrainians
to the Germans is the cross-cutting theme of entire media
space of the Carpathian periodicals. As a result of Y. Ba-
chinsky's meetings with J. Ribbentrop on October 19 and
those of A. Voloshin with the Editor-in-Chief of "Vö lkischer
Beobachter" K. Bigal on October 21, there were numerous
promises of support given. K. Bigal personally came to
Subcarpathia for negotiations about the protection of the
interests of the Germans in Mukachevo and Svaliava. It
was decided to maintain friendly relations and develop
diplomatic relations. Unfortunately, these contacts were of
a private nature, violated current Czech law and prompted
the slim hopes of the Transcarpathian movement's leaders
to create the "Ukrainian Piedmont"14.
The press reports on the first positive contacts with
German organizations and the steps of official Berlin rather
often and systematically. The formation of the pro-German
foreign policy orientation is explained by the need for
external support and strong opposition to encroachment
of Budapest and Warsaw in relation to seizure of the territory
of the region. The Ukrainian issue in the context of the
Czechoslovak crisis was covered not only in periodicals of
Subcarpathian Ruthenia but also in articles of the German
periodicals "Vö lkischer Beobachter", "Frankfurter Zeitung",
"Kö lnischen Zeitung" and "Essener Nazional Zeitung",
published on 24-25 October, which dealt with autonomy of
Carpathian Ukraine, reunification with Hungary etc.
The relations of Carpathian Ukraine with Germany as
with practically the only foreign-policy partner developed
perspectively to form a cooperation strategy and influenced
the state-building idea, as was announced by official
government documents. In "Nova Svoboda", with reference
to the Warsaw diary "ABZ", two directions of German foreign
policy were revealed. The first direction was represented
by the ideologist A. Rosenberg. He proposed a plan for the
creation of Piedmont from Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and
for the rest of the Ukrainian lands "liberation from the
Hungarians and Bolshevik captivity" was proposed. This
concept was called "Promethean". Another position was
described by R. Hess with the support of the Hungarians,
because the pro-Ukrainian policy of Germany would have
encountered with Great Britain and would have counte-
racted its movement in the East of Europe under the slogan
"if we did not return the colonies, we should give our free
hand in the East of the country"15.
According to its insiders, "Ukrainske Slovo" of Sep-
tember 25, describing the worthlessness of the Anglo-
French agreements, alluded to Hitler's plans to seize the
lands up to the Black Sea. French "Paris-Midi" of October
20 called the Subcarpathian region a key to Eastern
Europe and Germany did not want Ruthenia to go over to
some other state. Political subordination of the Ruthenia
region to Germany would open the way to Romanian oil
and bread. "Excelsior" and Warsaw "Dziennik" pointed out
that Romania, Ukraine and the Black Sea coast were
stages of German expansion to oil sources. Ruthenia was
considered as a wheel of the "Eurasian axis". Germany
aimed to reach Mosul and that conflicted with the sphere
of influence of Great Britain, which would lead to a conflict
of yesterday's allies.
The press informed community about Germany's plans
for the realization of Ukrainian issue, especially territorial
issue. Behind an information veil, Germany covered up
the true goals of Hitler's policy in Europe. On the other
hand, the idea of Hitler's campaign against Bolshevism
perfectly coincided with Western European expectations,
phobias and aspirations to prevent the unrestrained
13 Нова свобода (Nova Svoboda). Nov., 04, 1938, page 1.
14 Нова свобода (Nova Svoboda). Oct.,23, 1938, page 1.
15 Ibid: page 2.
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aggression of the Third Reich to the east. In respect of the
Carpathian Ukrainian issue, Berlin undertook a complex
diplomatic game, trying to subordinate to its influence
those states which interests were directly affected by the
existence of Ukrainian autonomy in the Subcarpathian
region. The Ukrainian issue therefore became a mere
instrument in the hands of the Third Reich which did not
intent to solve it, using Ukrainian national political forces
in its strategic plans.
Conclusions
A clear orientation in the geopolitical situation in Europe,
in the face of the growing aggressive policies of Poland
and Hungary under the silent position of France and Great
Britain, as well as political games of the fascist states,
helped the Ukrainians to take consistent steps in seeking
independence in the most difficult conditions of geopolitical
isolation and ethno-national tension, when the government
of autonomous Subcarpathian Ruthenia did not give up
hope for affirmation and preservation of the national form
of social life, even being alone with the hostile environment,
which rushed to the active contacts of people of Galicia
and Subcarpathia.
The cohesion on the main idea, which runs through
the entire media space of that period - resolving the national
issue and establishing statehood - allows to point out the
high political culture of the population of the region in the
conditions of destabilization of the political situation,
intensification of the aggressive activity of neighboring
Hungary and Poland, armed provocations and the ideolo-
gical pressures.
Reflecting public attitudes, the subcarpathian press
with optimistic hope supported the idea of the Promethean
conception of "Ukrainian Piedmont" proposed by A. Rosen-
berg, and, after all, was drawn into a major political game,
caught in the epicenter of the conflict of interests of the
great states, for which the question of national self-deter-
mination became illusive.
Public opinion, formed by the press, despite the positive
connotations of "peoples' right to self-determination" as a
compromise result of the Munich collusion, tracked a diplo-
matic game of world states that could not agree because
of their own ambitions, and for which, unfortunately, Subcar-
pathian Ruthenia became as currency.
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ПІДКАРПАТСЬКА РУСЬ В УМОВАХ ПЕРЕДВОЄННОЇ
МІЖНАРОДНОЇ КРИЗИ 1938 РОКУ ТА ТЕРИТОРІАЛЬНИХ ЗАЗІХАНЬ СУСІДНІХ ДЕРЖАВ
(ЗА МАТЕРІАЛАМИ РЕГІОНАЛЬНОЇ ПРЕСИ)
Крізь призму підкарпатської преси першої третини ХХ ст. висвітлено трагічний період становлення укра-
їнської державності напередодні ІІ Світової війни, перебіг боротьби за вільний розвиток української нації на
території Підкарпатської Русі внаслідок Мюнхенської угоди й небезпечної політичної гри Англії, Франції,
Німеччини та Італії, а також Польщі та Угорщини, в епіцентрі амбіцій яких опинилося Закарпаття. Подальшого
висвітлення отримали питання боротьби українців Закарпаття за втілення "права народів на самовизначен-
ня" в процесі силового формування спільного польсько-угорського кордону після Другої Чехословацької
кризи 1938 р., що дала початок фактичному поділові Чехословаччини з одного боку, та активізації націо-
нальних прагнень українців з іншого. Проаналізовано геополітичні аспекти гри центральноєвропейських
держав, а також Польщі та Угорщини в процесі "перекроювання Європи", міжнародні особливості політики
умиротворення агресора 1938 р. як процесу поступок та втрат, у яких закарпатські землі залишалися розмі-
нною монетою, а уряд автономної Підкарпатської Русі був змушений самотужки боротися проти імперського
ревізіонізму, агресивної пропаганди та руйнівних збройних диверсій. Спираючись на закарпатську періоди-
ку, автори показали розвиток взаємин між Карпатською Україною та практично єдиним зовнішньополітичним
партнером - Німеччиною - в контексті формування гітлерівської стратегії "Євразійської осі", де українським
землям відводилась значна роль. Досліджено чинники впливу на формування нової європейської політич-
ної реальності й ролі в ній українського краю. При використанні преси як ключового джерела історичних
даних відображено цілісну картину зазіхань і прагнень центральноєвропейських держав та їх практичні
наміри в умовах міжнародної кризи.
Ключові слова: Підкарпатська Русь; Карпатська Україна; українці-русини; Чехословацька криза 1938 р.;
Мюнхенський договір; преса; "Український П'ємонт"; спільний кордон.
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